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Residential segregation is analyzed via the Schelling model, in which two types of agents attempt
to optimize their situation according to certain preferences and tolerance levels. Several variants
of this work are focused on urban or social aspects. Whereas these models consider fixed values
for wealth or tolerance, here we consider how sudden changes in the economic environment or
the tolerance level affect the urban structure both in the closed city and open city frameworks,
i.e. depending on whether migration processes are relevant or not. In the closed city framework,
agents tend to group into clusters, whose boundary can be characterized using tools from kinetic
roughening. On the other hand, in the open city approximation agents of a certain type may enter
or leave the city in series of avalanches, whose statistical properties are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
People with similar features (culture, income, etc.)
tend to group together in the same neighborhood, giv-
ing rise to segregation on a social scale. More than 40
years ago, Schelling put forward a seminal model that de-
scribes this reality, linking individual preferences to the
macroscopic behaviour of the system [1]. Two different
social groups, which we may call red and blue, are dis-
tributed over a square lattice with some vacancies on it.
Agents are characterized by a tolerance T : the fraction of
different agents in their neighborhood that he or she can
tolerate. The model proceeds through the following dy-
namical rules: a random agent i is selected and his/her
fraction of diverse neighbors is evaluated. If this frac-
tion value is lower or equal than T , the agent remains
at his/her location. Otherwise, he/she relocates to the
nearest vacancy that meets his/her demands. For inter-
mediate values of T we observe segregation, and clusters
are formed with different types of agents.
This model has attracted a great deal of attention, due
to its simplicity and insight, giving rise to a wealth of
variants. System behaviour when one kind of agents are
tolerant and the vacancies are differently priced was char-
acterized in [2]. Differences between constrained models,
where only unhappy individuals are allowed to move, and
unconstrained ones, in which all agents can relocate to
vacancies as long as they keep or increase their happiness,
were also studied [3]. In [4], attempted relocations suc-
ceed with a probability which is modulated by a power-
law linking their current happiness and the attractiveness
of the offered place. The effect of the city shape, size and
form is investigated in [5], finding that the properties of
the system in equilibrium are weakly affected by these pa-
rameters. The authors of [8] proposed a thermodynamic
approach to segregation based on their cluster geometry,
and considered quantities analogous to the specific heat
and susceptibility, along with a connection with spin-1
models. Moreover, an open city model in which agents
can leave or enter the system was described in [9]. In
addition to showing different kinds of interfaces between
clusters, economic aspects of the system were introduced
by means of a chemical potential. Recently, the use of dif-
ferent tolerance levels for the agents was proposed in [10],
in a system with no vacancies, where agents could only
exchange locations with agents of a different type. On
the other hand, in [11] each cell of the system is consid-
ered a building containing many agents, and segregation
was considered both at a microscopic and a macroscopic
level, giving rise to a complex phase diagram. Some of
the mentioned works take into account the importance of
the initial conditions [2, 10], and some others also con-
sider migratory movements [9, 10].
In this article we consider how a closed city, in which
no agents can enter or leave, adapts to drops in the tol-
erance level. Under some circunstances, a vacancy inter-
face is observed separating the main clusters. We estab-
lish its statistical properties, specially its roughness. On
the other hand, we also consider an open city model in
which the system becomes more hostile towards one type
of agent (economic handicap) and more friendly towards
the other (economic advantage). This phenomenon can
give rise to a partial or total overtake of the favored type
of agent, which may proceed through avalanches. These
avalanches are shown to present a power-law behavior
which is usual of similar processes [6, 7]. Our general
framework is established in similarity with the Blume-
Emery-Griffiths (BEG) model in presence of an external
magnetic field [8, 9].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
define our BEG model and discuss the dynamics of both
regimes (open and closed city) and the evolution process.
In Section III we describe our results for the closed city
model III A and the open city model III B, linking them
to well-known social mechanisms: confrontation between
equal forces within the closed city or the overtaking of
one kind of agents over the other due to economic supe-
riority, which resembles a social process known as gen-
trification [12]. Our main conclusions and proposals for
further work are discussed in section IV.
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2II. MODEL
The Blume-Emery-Griffith model [13] was introduced
to study the behaviour of He3-He4 mixtures. In this
model the spin values considered are si = 0,±1. In the
presence of a magnetic external field, the Hamiltonian
can be written as:
H = −
∑
〈i,j〉
(
J sisj +K s
2
i s
2
j
)
+
∑
i
(
DB s
2
i +HB si
)
,
(1)
where 〈i, j〉 stands for the eight nearest neighbors of
a Moore neighborhood. This Hamiltonian represents a
spin-1 Ising model with coupling constant J , biquadratic
exchange constant K, crystal field DB and an external
magnetic field of intensity HB . The crystal field DB
acts as a chemical potential that controls the entry of
cells with non-zero spin value. Dissimilar entry fluxes
for s = +1 and s = −1 are obtained by means of the
magnetic field, HB .
In our interpretation of the BEG model spin values will
be associated with blue agents (si = +1), red agents (si =
−1) and vacancies (si = 0). A positive value of J yields a
negative energy for each pair of neighboring agents of the
same type, while a positive value of K assigns a negative
energy to every pair of neighboring agents, disregarding
their type. If DB > 0, the system reduces its energy by
expelling agents, and if HB > 0 , the system reduces its
energy either expelling blue agents or attracting red ones.
Under certain conditions, the Hamiltonian provided by
Eq. (1) can only decrease along the actual dynamical
trajectories of the system, thus serving as a Lyapunov
function [14].
In order to make an explicit connection between our
physical model and social realities, let us now define a
measure of the level of unhappiness of an agent in relation
with the parameters of Eq. (1). The lack of happiness of
agent i is measured by the dissatisfaction index Idis(i)
Idis(i) = Nd(i)− T [Ns(i) +Nd(i)] +D +H(i), (2)
where Ns and Nd are, respectively, the number of neigh-
boring agents of the same (s) and different (d) type, D
is a measure of the global economic level and is the same
for all agents. Meanwhile H(i) = +H for blue agents
and −H for red ones. It can be understood as half the
income gap between both types of agents. We will drop
the dependency on i when it is clear from context. The
condition for satisfaction will be, therefore,
Idis(i) ≤ 0. (3)
Notice that when D < 0 the system is generally
friendly towards agents, and unhappiness arising from
their neighborhood can be endured. This is the common
situation behind immigration processes: increased eco-
nomic opportunities compensate the lack of homogeneity.
On the other hand, when D > 0, the economic opportu-
nities have disappeared and the system becomes hostile.
Even when Ns > Nd, an agent might be forced to leave
the system under such circumstances. Moreover, the pos-
sibility that the wealth levels of both communities are not
similar is taken into account by the parameter H. When
its absolute value is large, agents of one type might be
forced to leave while the other type is attracted.
The number of similar and different neighbors can be
easily obtained from the spin variables of sites neighbor-
ing i,
Ns(i)−Nd(i) = si
∑
〈i,j〉
sj , (4)
Ns(i) +Nd(i) = s
2
i
∑
〈i,j〉
s2j , (5)
where the sum over 〈i, j〉 should be understood as a sum
over all j which are neighbors of i. Substituing Eq. (4)
and (5) into Eq. (1), we can rewrite our condition for the
satisfaction of agent i, Eq. (3), as
− si
∑
〈j〉
sj − (2T − 1) s2i
∑
〈j〉
s2j + 2Ds
2
i + 2Hsi ≤ 0, (6)
where j runs over his/her eight closest neighbors in the
Moore neighborhood. We will only allow moves that ei-
ther preserve or reduce the dissatisfaction index for each
agent, and their types are fixed. For constant values of
T , D and H, the energy of the BEG model becomes a
Lyapunov function:
H = −
∑
〈i,j〉
(
sisj + (2T − 1)s2i s2j
)
+ 2
∑
i
(
Ds2i +Hsi
)
,
(7)
with an external magnetic field. This Hamiltonian repre-
sents a spin-1 Ising model with coupling constant J = 1,
biquadratic exchange of strength 2T − 1, crystal field of
strength 2D and a magnetic field of intensity 2H, as it
can be seen by comparing with Eq. (1).
A. Closed city dynamics
Let us consider our agents to be living in an N × N
square lattice with open boundaries and a fixed vacancy
density ρ, in similarity to [8]. Agents will not be allowed
to enter or leave the system and, therefore, the global
economic level D and income inequality H need not be
taken into account. In this case, Eq. (2) reduces to
Idis(i) = Nd(i)− T [Ns(i) +Nd(i)]. (8)
3At each iteration, a random occupied site i and a ran-
dom vacancy j are selected. The proposed relocation is
accepted if Idis(j) ≤ 0, where Idis(j) is calculated using
Eq. (8). We must note that a relocation of an agent
to another place where his/her happiness level is infe-
rior is possible, if the destination environment verifies
T ≥ Nd(j)/ (Ns(j) +Nd(j)). In this situation the en-
ergy,
ES =
∑
〈i,j〉
sisj − (2T − 1)
∑
〈i,j〉
s2i s
2
j , (9)
is not strictly a Lyapunov function, because relocations
that increase the dissatisfaction level are allowed.
The parameters of the model in this situation are the
system size N , the tolerance level T and the vacancy
density ρ. Typical values for ρ in urban environments
are under 0.1. All our simulations start with a random
configuration.
B. Open city dynamics
Agents can enter or leave the N ×N lattice depending
on their dissatisfaction level, Eq. (2), and the economic
environment H and D must be explicitly considered.
The system dynamics is similar to the one described
in [9], and can be explained as follows: at each iteration
we choose a random site i. If it corresponds to a vacancy
we attempt to occupy it with an agent of a random type.
The movement is accepted if the selected agent presents
Idis(i) ≤ 0, see Eq. (2). On the other hand, if the selected
site is occupied we attempt an internal or an external
change with equal probabilities. For the internal change,
a vacancy is randomly chosen at site j (implying an in-
finte range interaction), and the dissatisfaction index for
the agent in the offered place, Idis(j), is calculated. The
internal change is accepted only if the dissatisfaction in
the new place is preserved or reduced: Idis(j) ≤ Idis(i). If
the external change is chosen, agent i attempts to leave
the system, which will take place if Idis(i) > 0. Open
city systems are controlled by a variety of parameters:
the economic environment variables, D and H, and the
tolerance level T .
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Closed city
As we have discussed in Sec II, two equal populations
of agents inhabit an N × N square lattice. We will use
N = 50 and a fixed vacancy ratio ρ = 6%, unless other-
wise specified. Agents can not enter or leave the system,
i.e. no external changes are allowed. However, an agent
i is able to move into an empty cell j, randomly offered,
if Idis(j) ≤ 0. Note that the relocation process may in-
crease the dissatisfaction index of some of the old or new
neighbors of the chosen agent.
A phase diagram for different values of T and ρ was
presented in [8], which we will take as our starting point.
Once the density ρ is fixed, T remains as the only control
parameter of the system. Thus, depending on its value,
the system can be found in three different states, which
we will call frozen, segregated and mixed, characterized
by the stationary morphologies and the acceptance rate
for relocations.
1. Low T , or frozen. Few changes are accepted and
the system remains close to the random initial con-
figuration: a random mixture of red agents, blue
agents and vacancies.
2. Medium T or segregated. Two big clusters are cre-
ated and the accepted change rate is close to 50%
in equilibrium.
3. High T or mixed. Almost all changes are accepted,
so no clusters are formed and the configuration re-
mains close to random.
We will put special emphasis on the sizes of the differ-
ent clusters, measured through the segregation coefficient
[15], s.c., given by
s.c. =
2
N4(1− ρ)2
∑
{c}
n2c , (10)
where c indexes all the clusters in the system and nc is
the number of agents in each cluster. This coefficient
ranges from values close to 0, where clusterization has
not taken place, to 1, where only two clusters remain
and nc = N
2(1− ρ)/2.
1. Continuous evolution of T
As it was discussed previously, we will focus on how the
system adapts to changes in tolerance. So, first, we char-
acterize the system behavior when the tolerance value T
decreases according to the following law
T (t) = 1− tanh
(
t
t0
)
, (11)
where t is the time measured in Monte Carlo steps and
t0 is a factor controlling the overall speed of the process.
Eq. (11) describes the evolution of the tolerance in a city
that changes from being extremely tolerant (T ∼ 1) to
totally intolerant (T ∼ 0). Futhermore, it is also possible
to consider the tolerance T as an analogue of the system
temperature [8], so the process can also be understood
as a cooling process.
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Figure 1. Evolution of the segregation coefficient as a function
of time (in Monte Carlo steps) for different t0 values, shown
in the figure key. The central lines correspond to the average
over 50 runs, while the coloured zone represents the region
for a confidence interval of 70%. Time ranges from 0 to 30t0.
The evolution of the segregation coefficient for different
values of t0 ranging from 1 (long dash) to 10
4 (solid) is
shown in Fig. 1. As t0 increases, the system spends more
time on intermediate values of T , rising the clusterization
effect. As a consequence, the segregation coefficient value
becomes larger. For t  t0, T becomes very low, the
lattice freezes and the structure created in the previous
stage remains. Time is measured in Monte Carlo (MC)
steps, corresponding to N × N iterations of the system
dynamics.
2. Sudden change in T
Let us consider the possibility of a sudden drop in the
tolerance towards a final value of T = 1/4. Two types of
societies are considered, depending on the initial value of
the tolerance denoted as Ti: one is highly tolerant, with
Ti = 7/8, and the other one is segregated, with Ti = 1/2.
We have observed a phenomenon that also takes place
under some conditions for the continuous variation: after
the change in T , the vacancies of the system are grouped
at the interfaces between red and blue agents, see Fig. 2
(a) and (b).
Let us consider a vacancy at a flat segment of the bor-
der between red and blue agents. We can calculate the
critical tolerance value for its location as T ∗ = 4/(4+4) =
1/2. Before the drop in tolerance, T = 1/2, so agents
can accept to move into these vacancies. After the drop,
when T = 1/4, no relocation can take place anymore to-
wards this place, because T < T ∗, so the vacancy must
remain empty. After a short time, most vacancies inside
clusters have been transferred into the interface and it
becomes flat. From a social perspective, nobody wants
to be placed between two intolerant social groups: red
agents find this place too close to the blue ones and vice
versa.
In order to characterize the interface we define the
grouped vacancy ratio, which is defined as the proportion
of vacancies that have either one or two more vacancies
in their neighborhood.
We can provide a theoretical estimate for this magni-
tude as a function of the population density ratio. Notice
that the grouped ratio should not depend on the toler-
ance before the cooling procedure, since vacancies follow
a random distribution. We can assume a binomial dis-
tribution for the presence of one or two vacancies among
the eight cells that comprise the Moore neighborhood,
(
8
1
)
ρ(1− ρ)7 +
(
8
2
)
ρ2(1− ρ)6. (12)
The grouped ratio is evaluated in four different situa-
tions in Fig. 2 (c). Measurements before the drop in T
are shown as red circles, which can be compared with the
theoretical estimates, shown as blue squares. Measures
after the drop are shown for T = 1/2 using black circles
and for T = 7/8 using purple circles. After the drop in
T , the grouped ratio presents major differences between
the segregated society (black circles, T = 1/2) and the
mixed society (purple circles, T = 7/8). As we can see
in Fig. 2 (b), a straight line dividing the system into
two big clusters requires at least N vacancies, i.e., the
system length. The corresponding value of ρ is, there-
fore, ρ = 1/N . In our case, N = 50 and the maximum
grouped ratio value reached corresponds to ρ = 0.02, as
we can see in Fig. 2 (c). If there are less vacancies, they
will be randomly placed along the boundary between the
clusters. However, when ρ > 1/N , some vacancies may
diffuse into the bulk of the clusters, while some other va-
cancies may allow the boundary to become rough. For
ρ  1/N most vacancies are located in the bulk, and
the grouped ratio approach the predictions following the
binomial distribution.
For Ti = 7/8 (purple circles in Fig. 2 (c)) these ar-
rangement effects on the boundary become negligible be-
cause clusters are not actually formed. Thus, the vacan-
cies can be reordered during the process, but the grouped
value only rises slightly along the procedure.
3. Characterization of the boundary
Even when the two clusters are well formed the inter-
face between them is not static. It tends to be flat in
average, but it always presents fluctuations. Thus, it is
relevant to estimate its roughness, W , defined as
W =
√
1
Nb
∑
i
h2i , (13)
where Nb is the total number of border vacancies, h its
height, defined as its distance to the average flat line, and
the summation index i runs over all the vacancies in the
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Figure 2. Long term configurations for (a) T = 0.5 and (b) T = 0.25 for N = 50 and ρ = 6%. (c) Grouped vacancy ratio as a
function of ρ. 50 runs and 20000 iterations are considered for each run.
interface. This roughness typically scales with system
size, W ∼ Nα, where α is usually called the roughness
exponent [16], as we can see in Fig. 3.
1.70 1.75 1.80 1.85 1.90 1.95 2.00
0.
05
0.
15
0.
25
log N
lo
g 
W
Figure 3. Roughness of the cluster interface as a function of
the system size N for flat boundary configurations, in log-
log scale. Each value represents the average of 50 runs over
150000 MC steps.
The interface is subject both to a smoothing effect
and a random noise. In other words, the system will
tend to flatten the boundary in order to minimize the
dissatisfaction of the agents, yet agent relocations are
random events that will disturb the shape of the inter-
face. The balance between both effects is reminiscent
of the Edward-Wilkinson (EW) and Kardar-Parisi-Zhang
(KPZ) universality classes [16]. Both of them present a
roughness exponent α = 1/2. Our estimate is close to
this value: α = 0.562± 0.006, as shown in Fig. 3. From
a social point of view, this roughness may describe the
tension between two intolerant groups in an enclosed lo-
cation.
4. Avalanche processes
The arrival of an agent into a new neighborhood can
decrease the satisfaction of one or more agents who may
wish to be relocated. When these agents occupy new
places, other agents close to them may feel frustrated
and desire a new location in the system, giving rise to a
chain reaction. Such avalanche phenomena in this setup
were already anticipated by Schelling [1].
In our closed city model, agents are relocated when
their new level of satisfaction is not acceptable, indepen-
dently of the effects on the neighborhood, as discussed in
Sec. II A. Under these circumstances, the energy is not
a Lyapunov function. This fact is illustrated in Fig. 4,
where we can see the time evolution of the energy of a sin-
gle run with T = 1/2 in the closed city dynamics scheme
(black line). Indeed, the energy curve is not strictly
monotonic, as expected. On the other hand, in the open
city dynamics the only allowed changes are those which
lower the dissatisfaction level for agents, thus making it
a Lyapunov function (red line).
60 20 40 60 80 100
−0
.8
−0
.4
0.
0
t
No
rm
al
ize
d 
En
er
gy
Closed
Open
Figure 4. Normalized energy evolution in MC steps for closed
and open city dynamics. Two single runs are considered for a
system with N = 50, ρ = 6% and constant T = 1/2. Energy
is normalized per agent and link by the factor 4N2(1− ρ).
B. Open city
Let us discuss the case in which the number of agents of
either type is not conserved. Again, as discussed in Sec.
II, we will consider agents of two types in a 100 × 100
square lattice. The initial configuration is random, with
red agents, blue agents and vacancies constituting each
1/3 of the total system. Let us stress that the happi-
ness level of the agents depends on the tolerance value
T , the economical level of the system D, and also the gap
between the financial incomes for each type of agent, H.
The system undergoes the following process: in the
first stage, with fixed values for T and D, with H = 0,
the system evolves allowing both internal and external
relocations, until a stationary state is reached with both
agent populations settled inside clusters, as we can see
in Fig. 5. Now, we proceed to increase H gradually, in
order to provide an economical advantage to one type
of agents over the other. Thus, a gentrification process
will start. As a consequence one of the agent types will
tend to leave the system, while the other will fill these
vacancies, giving rise to avalanches. From this moment
on, we will not allow internal relocations, because our
aim is to characterize migratory movements inside and
outside the city.
1. Types of borders
Starting from a random configuration, we set a finite
value for T and D, with H = 0. Given enough time,
the system reaches an equilibrium state where the bor-
ders have both straight and curved segments. In this
scenario, Ns can be either 4 or 5 for agents at the bound-
ary, depending on whether the agent stands at a straight
or a curved point of the boundary, as we can readily see
in Fig. 5. The dissatisfaction index of each agent dis-
minishes when the number of similar neighbors increases
(see Eq. (2)). Thus, any agent on a curved spot will leave
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5. For T = 1/4, detail of the border types: C (a), 0
(b), I (c) and II (d).
the lattice with higher probability than one at a straight
spot. This difference is the key to the creation of differ-
ent types of borders. Notice that, for a given value of
T , an agent for which D > T (Ns + Nd) − Nd becomes
unsatisfied and is transferred out of the lattice. Thus,
different types of borders can arise, associated with their
value for Nd.
• Nd = 4. If D < 0 the system is economically very
advantageous for all agents. Thus, there are almost
no vacancies in the system and they are located in
the corners between clusters. We will call this a
C-type border, see Fig. 5 (a).
• Nd = 3. Vacancies appear at straight segments sep-
arating both types of agents, in addition to corner
sites (Fig. 5 (b)). This kind of interface location
will be termed a 0-type border.
• Nd = 2. Straight segments of vacancies are com-
pleted, but contacts along diagonals between dis-
tinct clusters are allowed (I-type border [11]), as in
Fig. 5 (c).
• Nd = 1. Diagonal contacts between clusters are not
allowed any more (II-type border [11]), see Fig. 5
(d).
• Nd = 0. This is the usual situation in economically
handicapped systems, where D > 0. When D is
above this treshold the system expels all agents.
In previous work [9] borders of types I and II were
described and characterized by means of geometric con-
7structions. In this paper we have chosen to determine
them via threshold values, including borders of type C
and 0, which have not been reported previously.
2. Avalanche processes
At this point, we proceed to increase H gradually by
a fixed amount ∆H & T/2 every 50 time-steps. This
value is approximately half of the one needed to start
any avalanche process for a given neighborhood configu-
ration. In the economic interpretation, the system offers
less and less financial resources to blue agents, whose
economic level is given by µb = D + H. Meanwhile, red
agents become more and more prosperous, µr = D −H,
thus enlarging the economic gap. Both expressions ac-
count for the dissatisfaction or unhappiness of an agent
due to their economic conditions. Moreover, if we define
the happiness associated to being in a specific neighbor-
hood as λ = T (Ns+Nd)−Nd, the satisfaction condition,
Eq. (2), can be expressed now as
µr,b ≤ λ. (14)
The interpretation of Eq. (14) is straightforward:
when the satisfaction of being into a neighborhood, λ
compensates the unhapiness arising from the economic
situation, µr,b, the agent remains in the system. As we
keep increasing H, the gap between µr and µb opens up.
The system becomes more hostile towards blue agents,
which increase µb, and some of them are forced to leave
when Eq. (14) ceases to hold. Therefore, there appear
some new vacancies in the lattice. At the same time,
the effect is opposite for red agents: µr decreases and
the lattice is more satisfactory for them, because they
are getting more and more economic advantages. Thus,
red agents come from outside and occupy the vacancies
previously created. Now, some of the blue agents close
to these occupied locations cease to verify Eq. (14) be-
cause λ has decreased for them due to the arrival of red
agents. Thus, they may be transferred out of the system
on subsequent time-steps. This gives rise to further new
vacancies that are filled again with red agents and the
process goes on in a self-sustained way. This is what we
called a blue avalanche, because it originates with blue
agents leaving the lattice.
Yet, there is another way to generate an avalanche.
We depart from an equilibrium situation with some va-
cancies, which requires a mid-ranged economic environ-
ment, check Fig. 5 (b), (c) and (d). Before H is strong
enough to force blue agents out, red agents may be able
to fill these vacancies up. Blue agents next to these lo-
cations may cease to verify Eq. (14), as in the previous
situation, and are forced out of the system. These new
vacancies are occupied by red agents from outside, mak-
ing further blue agents leave. The process goes on, giving
rise to what we will call a red avalanche.
The value of H remains constant while these
avalanches take place. After the avalanches are finished,
if there are still some blue agents in the system the value
of H is increased further until a new avalanche takes
place.
The similarity with a gentrification process is clear:
one of the agent types gets richer while the other is be-
coming economically handicapped. The latter is forced
out of the system, leaving vacancies on the borders be-
tween the two clusters. Meanwhile, red agents with
more economic power enter the system and occupy these
vacancies. The process becomes self-sustained because
other agents from the less favoured group are forced to
leave the system due to their proximity to members of the
wealthy class. Of course, not all processes in the system
give rise to an avalanche.
Avalanches will be characterized by their size s, de-
fined as the total number of blue agents that have left
the lattice as a consequence of the departure of the first
one. We have obtained the avalanche size histograms,
and fitted them to a probability density function (PDF)
of the form
p(s) = Cxα exp(−x/x0), (15)
where C is the normalization constant, α accounts for
the scaling exponent for the avalanches and x0 acts as a
maximal cutoff value. For reasons of numerical stability
we focus on the complementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF) [17], which is fitted by the expression
C∗xα+1 exp−(x/x0). Data from 100 complete extinc-
tions of the blue agents in the system have been mea-
sured for each D value. For more numerical details, see
Appendix A.
The next sections are devoted to the analysis of
avalanche distributions for three values of T : low (T =
1/4), medium (T = 1/2) and high (T = 3/4). For each
value of T we have characterized the behavior of the sys-
tem for a wide range of fixed values of D, ranging from
the situation where no vacancies are present to the ex-
tinction point in which, due to the high hostility of the
medium all agents leave. We will vary H in order to
observe the avalanche processes for each D value consid-
ered.
Let us introduce a convenient notation to describe
neighborhoods, using s and d to denote similar and dif-
ferent neighbors, respectively, e.g. 3s+ 2d means that a
certain agent has 3 similar and 2 dissimilar neighbors.
3. Avalanche distributions for T = 1/4
We begin our study in a city with a high economic
interest, D = −2.125 and low tolerance value T = 1/4.
Under these circumstances the system exhibits a sta-
tionary state with big clusters of red and blue agents and
no vacancies, due to the low value of D. Now, we increase
H gradually, µb becomes higher, and some blue agents
8may abandon the lattice. In fact, these blues agents are
the ones which do not verify Eq. 14, and have 4s + 4d
neighbors. It must be noted that knowing the value of
T and the number of different and similar neighbors, λ
is fixed. Meanwhile, the situation for red agents keeps
improving: µr becomes lower, so the vacancies created
by the blue agents are filled by red agents coming from
outside. This is what we defined previously as a blue
avalanche (Sec. III B 2).
The system is so interesting economically for blue
agents that they will adopt different strategies in order
to remain, such as the formation of special cluster con-
figurations: triangles and rectangles in contact with the
system border. Thus, up to three avalanche processes
can be needed to deplete the system of blue agents, as
can be seen in Fig. 6 (a), where D = −2.125. To clarify
the order in which each avalanche occurs and its kind
(blue or red), we use the notation λn,k, where n denotes
the order and k takes value r for red and b for blue ones.
The fitted values for α and x0 in all these cases are shown
in Table I.
For D = −2.125 and increasing H gradually, we find
that the first three avalanches start at treshold values
λ1,b = −2.0, λ2,b = −1.75 and λ3,b = −1.0. Extending
our notation, we may say that each avalanche set has
a dominant process, which is characterized by the typi-
cal neighborhood of the expelled blue agents and their λ
value. The values previously calcultaed correspond with
certain neighborhood types: 4s+4d, 2s+3d and 5s+3d,
respectively. Of course, no avalanche consists of a sin-
gle type of process in practice. We must note that when
blue agents with a higher λ start their expulsion (such
as 2s + 3d) those with an inferior treshold (for example
4s + 4d) can be still be in process of leaving. Thus, it
is possible for various processes to take place simultane-
ously in the same avalanche. This is the situation for the
first and second avalanche sets, λ1,b and λ2,b in Fig. 6
(a). The process 4s + 4d dominates both avalanches so
their curves are close to each other. As the avalanche for
λ3,b is the last one for this D value, it has a smaller size
due the small number of blue agents remaining on the
lattice.
The social meaning is clear: the less favoured agents
will try to stand on an economic advantageous environ-
ment despite their income gap with the other group. To
achieve this goal diverse neighborhood structures will be
created (ghettos). This is the case scenario for neighbor-
hoods as Harlem or Clinton Hills [18].
Now, let us focus our attention on higher values of
D: −1.875, −1.625 and −1.375, as shown in Fig. 6 (b).
Although the environment is still economically advanta-
geous, the economic conditions are not as good as be-
fore. Some vacancies appear in the lattice and the sys-
tem presents a C type of border (Fig. 5 (a)). As we
explained before, different kinds of avalanches are still
possible. The first one takes place for D = −1.875. Red
agents coming from outside fill the existing vacancies on
the system when µr . −2.0. That points at a 4s+4d red
avalanche with λ1,r = −2.00 (Sec. III B 2). The next one,
D = −1.625, is what we may call a purple avalanche: a si-
multaneous red avalanche with λ1,r = −2.00 as in the for-
mer case, and a blue avalanche, 4s+3d with λ1,b = −1.25,
due to the overcoming of both tresholds at the same time
(D±H). We must note that the 4s+ 3d is the vecindary
associated with a 0-type border (Fig. 5(b)). So, while
the red agents coming from outside are filling the vacan-
cies with 4s + 4d which correspond to a C-type border,
blue agents with 4s+ 3d are leaving the system creating
a 0-type border. Finally, we have blue avalanches for the
first and second avalanche sets with D = −1.375, being
their associated neighborhoods 4s + 3d and 3s + 1d, re-
spectively. The behavior of blue avalanches is similar to
the ones explained for D = −2.125. Interestingly, red
avalanches are more frequent than blue ones, although
they present smaller sizes, as we can readily see in Fig.
6 (b) and Table I. Red avalanches interfere among them,
thus reducing the maximum cut-off, x0.
The last value that we analyze for T = 1/4 is D =
0.875. The behaviour of the blue avalanche suffers an
important change because the condition for a predomi-
nant vacancy state is verified, D/T > 3 [9]. Combin-
ing eq. (2), with H = 0, and Eq. (3) the condition
for an agent to remain on the system can be written as
Nd ≤ (Ns −D/T )/(1/T − 1). As T is lower than unity,
the denominator stays positive, so the numerator of the
former equation dictates the agent behaviour. Any agent
must fulfill the condition Ns ≥ D/T to remain on the lat-
tice, even if no different agent is in the vecindary. As the
system initial configuration is random and both kinds
of agents and vacancies are equally likely, the probabil-
ity for an agent to have more than three similar neigh-
bors is small. Therefore, when D/T > 3 the system
becomes very hostile, agents leave massively, and only a
small number of them remain inside clusters, shortening
x0 (Fig 7 a). The border between clusters is not relevant
anymore: red clusters grow with a vecindary as (3s+ 0d)
and blue ones become smaller when agents have a neigh-
borhhod (4s+ 0d) (Fig 7 (b) and (c).
Socially, the situation for blue agents might be com-
pared to the Chicago suburbs where the population could
increase their personal ties via a community network [9].
These ties may prevent a massive exodus despite the
lack of attractiveness of the environment. However, in
our model, the evolution of the system departs from this
situation and develops in two opposite directions: blue
agents are removed from the system, in contrast to red
agents, which increase their population. This could be
understood as the unrelated behavior of two communi-
ties. One of them chooses to cooperate and the ensuing
growth overcomes economical hardships. The other one
does not strength their links and is forced to leave the
city.
Finally, we show the values of the fitted parame-
ters in Table I, being xc the choosen size for the fit-
ting (Appendix A). We can find α values in the range
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Figure 6. CCDF of the avalanche distribution sizes for T = 1/4. For each curve the D value is specified. Treshold values
are given as λn,k where n is the avalanche set index and k its kind: r for reds, b for blues and p for purple ones. For purple
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Figure 7. From left to right: snapshot of the system evolution for T=1/4 and D=0.875. Equilibrium (a), 6 MC steps (b) and
13 MC steps (c).
[−1.78,−0.98] previously reported in references [19–23],
concerning self-organized criticality in different systems.
B A D α x0 xc C
N b −2.125 −1.781± 0.002 16.2± 0.3 40 1.20± 0.03
C r −1.875 −1.77± 0.02 15.0± 0.3 30 1.15± 0.02
C p −1.625 −1.50± 0.01 24.7± 0.6 50 1.20± 0.03
C b −1.375 −1.38± 0.02 23.7± 0.5 50 1.21± 0.03
0 r −1.125 −1.37± 0.03 3.30± 0.04 20 1.42± 0.04
0 p −0.875 −1.716± 0.008 42.8± 0.9 50 1.13± 0.02
0 b −0.625 −1.618± 0.004 140± 1 240 1.23± 0.02
I r −0.375 −1.35± 0.02 18.0± 0.3 40 1.14± 0.02
I p −0.125 −1.463± 0.004 79.2± 0.6 150 1.15± 0.01
I b 0.125 −1.495± 0.005 181± 4 200 1.26± 0.02
II r 0.375 −1.136± 0.007 20.9± 0.2 50 1.12± 0.01
II p 0.625 −1.41± 0.03 69.9± 0.4 150 1.081± 0.008
V rb 0.875 −1.33± 0.02 9.6± 0.3 20 1.15± 0.02
Table I. Avalanche distribution parameters (T = 1/4) for D
values from (Section III B 3). B is the type of border, with ’V’
meaning vacancy dominated regime. A is the avalanche type,
(’b’ is blue, ’p’ is purple and ’r’ is red), α is the power law
exponent, x0 accounts for cutoff value and xc is the chosen
size for the fitting (see Appendix A).
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Figure 8. CCDF of the avalanche distributions for T = 1/2 in
the predominant vacancy state, represented by symbols. The
fitted power-law cutoff functions are depicted with lines.
4. Avalanche distributions for T = 1/2 and T = 3/4
Most of the processes that arise for these values of
T are avalanches with similar parameter values and be-
haviours to those explained in the previous section (Sec.
III B 3).
Nevertheless, as this T fixed value is larger than be-
fore, the dissatisfaction index disminishes and Eq. 14 is
verified for higher values of D. Thus, despite being in a
less economically interesting system, agents populate the
lattice. As a consequence the range of values of D for
which the system is vacancy dominated increases.
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The two last avalanches for T = 1/2, D = 1.750 (short
dash) and D = 1.875 (long dash) are in the predominant
vacancy state (Fig. 8). They are also really close to
each other, suggesting that the same mechanism takes
place and it is related to 4s + 0d neighborhoods with
λ1,b = 2.00. This process implies that the blue agents
will be expelled when they are surrounded by vacancies.
The system evolution for D = 1.750 is apparently sim-
ilar to the one in Fig. 7. Nonetheless, the environment
has become so hard that red agents are not able to ex-
pand as the blue agents progressively leave the city, con-
verting a purple avalanche into a blue one. From a social
perspective it can be explained as people leaving the city
looking for a better financial situation somewhere else,
abandoning the neighborhood into obliteration.
One of the most interesting processes in our work takes
place for D = 1.625 (continuous), and is also found in the
predominant vacancy state (Fig. 8). It is convenient to
depict its evolution in Fig. 9. As it is shown, the first
procedure that takes place is the red cluster expansion
(Fig. 9 b)) for the neighborhood 3s+0d which takes place
when µr . 1.5. This mechanism proceeds until a blue
cluster is found. As the red cluster grows, the population
increases. When both kinds of agents are close, the 4s+
1d red avalanche removes all blue agents. For this D
value, α = −0.97± 0.01, x0 = 17.4± 0.3.
This two stage process may be interpreted as the ex-
pansion of some kind of neighborhoods that improve their
economical status and are able to increase their size,
wrapping around other devaluated zones. After that, a
gentrification process starts. This process is reminiscent
of the transformation of small towns or villages close to
growing commuting zones [24].
Finally, for T = 3/4, multiple D values are found in
the vacancy dominated regime, but all the situations are
related to those previously explained. Type of borders 0,
I and II are found to be in this situation.
When the system is in the predominant vacancy state,
there are only two processes that guarantee the com-
plete removal of blue agents. The first one is associated
with 3s+0d neighborhoods and consist of the red cluster
expansion, which changes the environment. After that,
other complementary processes take place (as in Fig. 9).
The other one is related to 4s+ 0d neighborhoods, which
implies the total expulsion of blue agents surrounded by
vacancies (Fig. 7). As a consequence, fitted parameters
are close to the ones previously calculated for other val-
ues of T in the same situations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Summing up, interesting results which can be corre-
lated to socio-economical situations emerge when a vari-
ation of parameters such as the tolerance in the closed
city framework or H in the open city model are consid-
ered.
The generalization of the open city model provides a
new framework for the study and understanding of a
broad class of segregation processes. Besides analyzing
its results from a social and economical perspective, the
model is also linked with the physics of the BEG model
under the influence of an external magnetic field. We
have considered this model under two different and com-
plementary angles: the closed city (Sec. III A) and the
open city approximation (Sec.III B).
In the closed city approximation the only relevant so-
cial variable is the tolerance. Since agents can not enter
or leave the city, economic environment variables do not
play a role in this case. We characterize the behaviour
of the system when the tolerance falls in a continuous
or a sudden way, after the system has reached equilib-
rium for an intermediate or high tolerance value. For the
continuous decay we have found that the final clusteriza-
tion degree of the system, measured via the segregation
coefficient, depends on the drop rate: for slow rates the
system has enough time to create clusters, so the segre-
gation coefficient is close to unity (Fig. 1). The main
feature is that once the system has reached equilibrium
for T = 1/2 a sudden drop in tolerance (T = 1/4) creates
a vacancy border between the two big remaining clusters
(Fig. 3). The interface rugosity, W , scales with the sys-
tem length N as W ∼ Nα with α = 0.562 ± 0.006. The
equilibrium state is not static and from a social point of
view it might describe the tension between two intolerant
groups in an enclosed location.
Nonetheless, this approach presents some handicaps.
The decision to accept or reject a change does not take
into account the agent current happiness level, which
does not seem realistic. Usually, happy people do not
want to move to another location. Besides, the charac-
terized system corresponds to the situation with a flat
interface. Yet, a different disposition of the clusters is
possible: one of the agent types may concentrate around
a system corner developing a circular border. The anal-
ysis of this situation goes beyond the aim of the present
paper.
For the open city model, in which agents can leave
or enter the city, not only tolerance but two economic
terms are taken into consideration: D is associated with
the mean economic city level, and H stands for the eco-
nomic gap between both types of agents. The dynamical
rules are the following: once the system has evolved into
an equilibrium state, fixing T and D, H progressively
decreases. In the economical sense, there are less finan-
cial resources available for blue agents, meanwhile, red
agents are becoming prosperous, so an economic sepa-
ration is created. Some blue agents, generally the ones
that are closer to the red agents, begin to leave the city.
These new vacancies are occupied by red agents coming
from outside, so the process goes on in a self-sustained
way, and resembles gentrification.
A power law with exponential cutoff expression has
been used to describe the avalanche size histograms.
While the cutoff length depends on the system size, the
power law exponents are in the range [−1.781,−0.97],
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Figure 9. From left to right: snapshot of the system evolution with T = 1/2 and D = 1.625. Equilibrium (a), 30 MC steps (b)
and 50 MC steps (c).
values that can be found in the literature for diverse
avalanche processes.
In our modified Schelling model gentrification pro-
cesses could also help understand the formation of ghet-
tos, as special configuration of the less favoured class in
order to remain in the cities. Moreover, our results high-
light the importance of tolerance and ties for people to
be satisfied despite harsh conditions. On one hand, col-
laboration inside of a neighborhood implies an improv-
ing in economic and trading exchanges, making growth
possible. On the other hand the lack of ties in a disfavor-
able environemt results in the neighboorhood progressive
degradation.
Further studies should focus on variants in which
agents consider their future happiness perspectives [25],
or the influence of altruistic behaviour [26] and the bal-
ance between cooperative and individual dynamics [27].
The transfer rules from these works combined with the
extended open city model presented in this paper could
lead to a framework where evolution of a city could be
analyzed during several stages.
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Appendix A: Fitting the avalanche histograms
Some numerical difficulties associated with direct es-
timation of α and x0 from the probability density func-
tion (PDF) of the histograms are known to arise [17].
In order to address them, we have resorted to the use
of the complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF). Our analytical form is given by Eq. (A1).
P (s) = Pr(X > s) =
ˆ ∞
s
Cx−α exp(−x/x0)dx = F (α, x0) +G(α, x0)sα+1 exp−(x/x0)
[
1 +
1
2 + α
s
x0
+ ...
]
. (A1)
The terms inside the brackets are an expansion of
M(1, 2 + α, s/x0), where M is the confluent hypergeo-
metric function. Once α and x0 have been estimated,
both F (α, x0) and G(α, x0) take fixed values. In fact,
F (α, x0) does not introduce significative changes in the
fit, and it can be neglected. Under these circumstances,
and retaining only the leading term of the series, we have
P (s) ≈ G(α, x0)xα+1 exp(−x/x0). (A2)
Consequently, we can infer the exponent α and the length
x0 of an avalanche from the CCDF of the avalanche his-
togram.
The experimental CCDF data series in our avalanches
have been calculated from 100 complete extinctions of the
blue agents. After that, data are plotted with a constant
bin size by means of the poweRlaw R package [28]. Then
an expression of the type C∗xα+1 exp−(x/x0), where
C∗ ≈ G(α, x0) is fitted by the nonlinear least square
method from the stats subroutines [29]. Although the
curves have been depicted for a wide avalanche size range,
they have been fitted inside the interval [1, xc), being xc
a choosen value to uphold precision. Deviations between
data and fit can appear for s  x0, due to the series
expansion approximation and the own nature of the tail
distribution, but they are not relevant. As a practical
rule, if x0 < 60 then xc ≤ 2x0 (see Table I). Choosing xc
in this way, the precision of the fit improves for a wide
range of avalanche size values.
